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Part IV (chapters 13-18) is about forecasting the course ofthe economy in the
near future, that is, up to 2 years, or eight quarters, ahead. Only the true ex
ante predictions that are nontrivial and verifiable are considered, and only for
a relatively small number ofprincipal u.S. macroeconomic variables, real and
nominal. The period covered is limited to the last three or four decades by the
availability ofthe forecasts, but the spectrum ofsources and methods covered
is broad. Empirical studies ofhow macroeconomic forecasts and expectations
are formed and what their properties and accuracy are have useful lessons
despite their relatively short history. This chapter will serve as an introduction
and guide to the subject; the chapters that follow deal much more thoroughly
with several ofits dimensions. 1
13.1 Functions and Contents
Economic forecasts refer to economic aspects ofunknown events, whether
in the past, present, or future. It is of course the future that attracts most
attention, since the practical purpose ofthe forecasts is to help formulate and
improve public and private plans and decisions, which are necessarily forward
looking. Formal forecasts ofeconomists attempt to take into account the col-
lective effects of these decisions, but they also influence in various ways and
degrees the informal expectations of consumers, investors, business manag-
ers, and government officials.
The "unknown events" come in many different types and forms. The most
common and regular targets of macroeconomic forecasting are the rates of
growth in real GNP and its major expenditure components, the unemployment
1. Some of sections below draw in part on material in my earlier publications (Zamowitz
1972b, 1974) and update it.
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rate, and inflation and interest rates. Many professional forecasts are more
detailed and extend to such cyclically sensitive series as corporate profits,
industrial production, and housing starts. Large econometric model services
help predict hundreds ofvariables that are ofinterest to subscribers. Financial
forecasters concentrate on stock and bond prices and yields and on exchange
rates, all ofwhich are highly volatile, responsive to a continuous flow ofnews
and rumors that affect traders' expectations, and notoriously difficult to pre-
dict.
Indeed, it is often argued that financial and other major economic series
behave largely as random walks and hence cannot be predicted at all. But the
overall stock market movements over intermediate and longer horizons, for
example, have clearly strong trend-cycle components. They are both persis-
tent and pervasive (large majorities ofindividual stock prices participate), an-
ticipatory ofbusiness cycle and growth cycle turns, and related to other highly
cyclical variables, notably corporate profits and (inversely) interest rates. 2
Predicting routine events in economics and business generally takes the
form of periodic forecasts of time-series values. In addition, there are events
of special concern such as the turning points of business and growth cycles,
financial panics and major bankruptcies, strikes, international crises and wars,
and so on. Forecasters mayor may not try to anticipate cyclical turns with the
aid of leading indicators, but in any event their time-series predictions have
implications for the timing of these events that need to be monitored and
checked. Exogenous shocks, such as a sharp rise in oil prices due to a foreign
cartel action or a threat of war, are not amenable to economic forecasting but
their consequences for general business activity are.
Real aggregates and price indexes typically have upward trends reflecting
economic growth and inflation, respectively; nominal aggregates expand for
both reasons. Growth trends are long-term movements that dominate compre-
hensive output, employment, and related income and expenditure series in
real terms across decades. In the period covered by our forecasts, inflation too
has been persistent as well as pervasive. Cyclical fluctuations prevail over
intermediate horizons ofseveral quarters and years. In the shortest run, mea-
sured in weeks and months, changes in most economic time series are heavily
influenced by irregular variations from random causes and by intrayear, ap-
proximately periodic, seasonal movements. But the forecasts are generally in
quarterly and annual units, and they aim at seasonally adjusted values wher-
ever seasonal movements exist; furthermore, the random noise in the series is
unforecastable. In practice, then, the systematic part of the time series cov-
ered by the short-term macroeconomic forecasts (as defined above) consists
ofelements oftrend and, to a larger extent, cyclical movements.
It follows that a forecast should be judged successful ifit approximates well
that systematic part ofits target (which includes the effects ofpast shocks and
2. See chapter 11, sec. 11.4.2, for more detail and references.387 Short-Term Predictions of General Economic Conditions
seasonal innovations to the extent they are knowable). But this task is gener-
ally much more difficult than it sounds. Movements that are "systematic" are
persistent or recurrent, but they are by no means predetermined, periodic, or
repetitious. As noted earlier, trends and cycles interact with each other and
contain stochastic elements. The economy in motion is a complex ofdynamic
processes, subject not only to a variety ofdisturbances but also to gradual and
discrete changes in structure, institutions, and policy regimes. No wonder that
there are few (if any) constant quantitative rules (e.g., time-invariant linear
econometric equations) to help the macroeconomic forecaster effectively and
consistently over more than a few years or from one business cycle to another.
13.2 Sources and Uses
Business and economic forecasting in the United States today is a highly
diversified "industry" of significant size. A large majority ofits members are
business economists whose main function is to provide information to im-
prove managerial decisions. The membership of the National Association of
Business Economists grew rapidly from 322 in 1959 (the year NABE was
founded) to 1,682 in 1969 and 2,749 in 1979; it peaked at 3,491 in 1983,
declined to 3,098 in 1987, and rose to more than 3,300 in 1989 and 1990. By
far most of these people are professionals working for private companies in
manufacturing, finance, trade, services, consulting, etc.; some are in govern-
ment at all levels and in academic institutions. They use macroeconomic fore-
casts in their work as inputs to assessments ofprospects for their own activi-
ties or concerns (firms, industries, regions), but only a minority are regular
producers of such forecasts. Thus the "macro panel" of NABE (which quar-
terly updates predictions of annual changes in real GNP and components, in-
flation and interest rates, and other aggregative variables) now has 125 partic-
ipants, and the actual number of regular macroeconomic forecasters is
probably ofthe order of200-250. 3
The forecasting units vary in size from individuals and small teams to siza-
ble economic divisions of some large corporations and multibranch special-
ized consulting and forecasting firms. Some of the last operate large-scale
econometric models and provide customer services internationally.4 The de-
mand for macroeconomic forecasts is to a substantial degree met by subscrip-
tions to such services and also to publications that frequently survey groups
of professional forecasters and list their individual and average predictions. 5
3. I am very grateful to David L. Williams, secretary-treasurerofNABE, for help in collecting
the factual information used in the text paragraph above. The membership figures exclude student
and institutional members.
4. Among the largest and best known are Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc.
(WEFA), and Data Resources, Inc. (DRI). See Adams 1986 and Eckstein 1983.
5. Monthly surveys of forecasters available by subscription are the Blue Chip Economic Indi-
cators (since 1978) and Economic Forecasts: A Worldwide Survey (since 1984). A quarterly sur-
vey in the public domain was conducted by NBER and the American Statistical Association from388 Chapter Thirteen
Since the supply comes from a small number ofrelatively large producers and
many small ones, the forecasting industry can be described as a mixture of
oligopolistic and competitive elements. But it is also arguable that the market
for forecasts is one ofmonopolistic competition as the overall number ofsell-
ers is large, the products are differentiated in several respects, and the barriers
to entry seem low. In other countries, macroeconomic forecasting is generally
much more concentrated, either in a few private sources or in government
agencies and publicly supported economic research organizations.6
u.S. government forecasts that are designed to serve as inputs into the eco-
nomic policy-making originate in several agencies: the Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA), the Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB), the Treasury,
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
in the Department ofCommerce. Many ofthese forecasts are for internal uses
only and based on economists' models and judgments (FRB and BEA have
their own macroeconometric models). The official forecasts that are pub-
lished, such as those of the CEA in the Economic Report ofthe President
(January or February ofeach year), are end products ofinteraction among top
policymakers as well as their economic advisers.
Those who must forecast regularly and frequently are likely to be absorbed
by technical requirements of their profession: monitoring and processing in-
formation, analyzing current economic and political developments, preparing
reports, and interpreting results. Most are pragmatic and use all data and ap-
proaches that they deem helpful to improve their predictions; few spend much
time on working with and testing specific theoretical models. The principal
scientific and academic use of the forecasts is to test the various hypotheses,
models, and methods employed by the forecaster, but this task is largely left
to the outside observer. The same applies to another, quite different but also
important aspect ofpredictions ofeconomic change, namely, that they may be
useful in providing data to study how expectations are formed, transmitted,
and revised.
All these are definitely bona fide uses of forecasts. But some forecasts are
at least occasionally and secondarily used as means of communicating inten-
tions and influencing opinion, which may bias them or make them otherwise
questionable.
In short, economic and business forecasters serve many different masters.
1968:4 to 1990:1. It is being continued, in essentially unchanged form, by the Federal Reserve
Bank ofPhiladelphia.
6. The former case is well represented by Canada: see the instructive analysis in Daub 1987,
ch. 6. The latter situation prevails in several European countries. For example, in Germany six
economic research institutes dominate the field; elsewhere the most influential forecasts originate
in ministries offinance and economic affairs, central banks, universities, and research institutes.
There are probably many private business forecasts as well but few are collected and publicized.
For a comprehensive index of organizations engaged in macroeconomic forecasting worldwide,
see Cyriax 1981.389 Short-Term Predictions of General Economic Conditions
Much oftheir output is communication to the business or government admin-
istrators who employ their services; some is being done for the outside world:
peers, professionals, the interested public. And it is not unusual for their prod-
ucts to have both internal and external uses. For example, an econometric
model developed at a university may serve as a basis for scientific work and
also as a source offorecasts circulated to business subscribers; aggregate fore-
casts by the economic staff of a corporation are a basic input to micropredic-
tions of sales, etc., but are also used in the company's publications and
speeches by its executives; and so on.
Forecasters face all sorts of conflicts ofevidence and opinion, which they
often resolve by various internal compromises; since their work is essentially
conjectural, much of this seems inevitable. The multipurpose nature of some
forecasts may complicate the situation considerably by bringing forth some
conflicts ofinterest as well.
13.3 Quality and Accuracy
The decision maker who knows the cost ofacquiring and using the forecast
and the returns attributable to it should in principle be able to evaluate the
quality ofthe forecast exactly, at least in retrospect. This is an ideal condition
but good approximations to it may exist in massive routine applications of
simple methods to replicable problems. Thus a manufacturing company with
thousands of products must use low-cost time-series models for purposes of
inventory control and production scheduling; it can experiment with alterna-
tive models and choose the most cost-effective ones with considerable confi-
dence. However, economic forecasting generally cannot be reduced to such
situations. In macroforecasting especially, there is a wide choice of sophisti-
cated models and techniques, a major role for judgment, but little opportunity
for any controlled experimentation. Microlevel information required for a
comparative analysis ofcosts and returns is usually confidential and not avail-
able to an outside observer; on a macrolevel, such information may not exist
at all orbe very underdeveloped and costly.
However, with reasonably reliable and prompt information, it is possible to
assess short-term aggregate forecasts in a meaningful way by ex post compar-
isons with actual outcomes. Verifiability so defined is a necessary condition
for the forecasts to be potentially useful. Hence it seems natural to view the
overall accuracy ofa given set ofpredictions as the principal single aspect of
their quality, that is, goodness in use. But accuracy is relative and it depends
on other characteristics that differentiate forecasts such as scope, span, and
timeliness. These too codetermine quality and are in principle amenable to
objective measurement.
Comparisons ofaccuracy are often impeded because the differences among
forecasts with respect to their other attributes are difficult to allow for by stan-
dardization or classification. The lack of information about the costs offore-390 Chapter Thirteen
casts may seem to be a principal obstacle. But cost levels and differentials
have been greatly reduced by computer technology and competition among
forecast makers and collectors. Although surely relevant, they are probably
no longer of major importance for ranking macroeconomic predictions pro-
duced by different sources and methods.
Information about the models or the reasoning behind the forecasts is
clearly desirable in general and critical for some purposes of research and
knowledge. Many business forecasts come with general explanations of the
underlying assumptions and arguments, and econometric model services sell
large amounts of numerical detail on the equations and adjustments used in
their control solutions, alternative simulations, etc. But it is much easier to
assess the accuracy of forecasts than the quality of economic analysis and
judgment, and the information necessary for the latter task is often neither
provided to nor demanded by commercial and lay users.
It is true that a prediction can be "correct for the wrong reasons"-although
based on assumptions contrary to fact, it may fortuitously produce only a
small error. The converse is also possible, as when a model supported by
theory and past experience fails because of some unanticipated shock. This
suggests that a quantitative analysis offorecast errors is not sufficient; a qual-
itative analysis of how each prediction was derived is needed to evaluate the
forecasts. However, this argument can be carried too far. Individual predic-
tions may indeed suffer from excusable assumptions about "exogenous," per-
haps noneconomic, events, but if a forecaster's performance is below par on
the average over time, it is hard to accept wrong assumptions as a justifica-
tion.
7
More generally, a few sporadic successes or failures do not prove that a
given source or method offorecasts is or is not accurate. To reduce the role of
chance, measures of average accuracy are needed, and they are the more in-
formative the longer and more varied the periods covered. Unfortunately, the
available samples of forecasts are mostly small, since few forecasters have
produced long, consistent time series ofverifiable predictions.8
In the end, knowing the size of prediction errors is necessary for any ap-
praisal of the consequences of these errors, although it is usually not suffi-
cient. In choosing the products of different forecasters, users act rationally
when they prefer those with comparative advantages in past accuracy or at
least attach to them greater weights.9
7. It is generally prudent for the forecaster to state carefully his or her basic assumptions, and
the information may help the forecast users and judges. However, surrounding predictions with
hedges against all kinds of unforeseeable events detracts from their usefulness, particularly for
business purposes.
8. The samples are numerous and diverse in terms ofsources, methods, variables, and predic-
tive horizons, but this "cross-sectional" richness is not a good substitute for the paucity of long
time series offorecasts.
9. Whether superior forecasters exist is a related but separate matter, about which more later in
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13.4 Summary Measures ofAbsolute Accuracy
The choice between different measures of accuracy depends upon the fore-
caster's or user's conception ofhow errors of different types and sizes reduce
the usefulness ofthe forecast. For example, ifthe loss depends simply on the
size of the difference between the predicted and actual value, the appropriate
summary measure is the mean absolute error (MAE). Iflarge errors in either
direction are considered much more serious than the small ones, squares of
the differences should be used, and the proper average is the root mean square
error (RMSE). 10
In still different situations, the sign as well as the size of the error may
matter so that the loss function is asymmetric, with underestimates preferred
to overestimates, or vice versa. For example, ifmanagement would rather err
on the side of too low than too high inventory holdings, it may prefer under-
estimates ofsales, that is, penalize them less than overestimates in weighting.
However, it does not follow that such a user should favor forecasts with a
built-in corresponding "bias": it seems best for the forecaster to produce best
unbiased predictions and for the user to apply to the results whatever his or
her loss function is, by appropriately weighting the errors. One can conceive
of an indefinite number of diverse individual loss functions; for example,
turning-point errors may be treated as particularly serious, errors smaller than
some present threshold values may be ignored as implying a zero loss, and so
on. But little is known about the distribution of user performance, and for
practical reasons ofgeneral acceptability and comparability, only a few simple
types oferror measures are commonly in use (mostly MAE and RMSE).
Table 13.1 covers a large number ofpredominantly judgmental forecasts by
business economists and some others, summed up in two sets; the principal
government forecast; and the longest series offorecasts made by econometri-
cians working with a family of macroeconomic models. The group averages
from surveys offorecasters conceal the dispersion oferrors in the predictions
of individual participants, which is often large, and they are always more
accurate over time than most of their components (see chapters 15 and 16).
For the end-of-year predictions ofnominal GNP growth in the year ahead, the
MAEs show these broad "consensus" forecasts to be about as accurate as the
government and econometric forecasts (cf. cols. 2 and 6 with 4 and 8, lines
2-4). These measures refer to periods between 1963 and 1989, range from
0.8 to 1.3 percentage points, average 1.0, and have a standard deviation of
0.2. The earliest available collection of forecasts, for 1956-63, shows a
larger MAE of 1.6 percentage points (line 1).
Similarly, the comparisons across the different sets of annual forecasts of
10. The RMSE is a particularly convenient measure mathematically and statistically because it
is optimal under a quadratic loss criterion, corresponds to the ordinary least squares estimation
procedure, and lends itselfto decomposition into systematic (bias, inefficiency) and residual vari-
ance components. The MAE corresponds to an alternative V-shaped loss function, where the cost













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.393 Short-Term Predictions ofGeneral Economic Conditions
real GNP growth (RGNP) show fairly small and unsystematic differences in
overall accuracy for each ofthe four periods covered between 1959 and 1989.
Here the MAEs have a range of 1.0-1.6 percentage points, mean of 1.2, and
standard deviation of0.2 (lines 5-8).
For the corresponding forecasts of inflation in terms of the implicit price
deflator (IPO), the MAEs have a wider range of0.6-1.4 percentage points, a
mean of 1.1, and standard deviation of0.3. However, the interforecast differ-
ences in each line are particularly small here (lines 9-12).
The errors in table 13. 1 are measured from preliminary data first published
after the end of the forecast target year. This allows us to compare the arith-
metic and absolute means of these forecasting errors with the corresponding
averages for the measurement errors defined as differences between the per-
centage changes in the preliminary and revised data. The MAEs ofthe prelim-
inary data, so computed, have a range of0.3-0.6 and average 0.4 (col. 10);
they are quite sizable compared with the MAEs ofthe forecasts proper, which
have a range of0.6-1.6 and average 1.1. (Compare these measures also with
the mean absolute percentage changes in preliminary data, which interest-
ingly increased over the successive periods for IPO and GNP but decreased
for RGNP; see col. 12.) The early data tended to underestimate the revised
data by about - 0.3 (col. 11).
Predictions of the rates of change in GNP and RGNP made quarterly for
the year ahead show similar MAEs of 1.1-1.4 even for most subperiods ofthe
difficult decade of the 1970s, but they show much higher MAEs of 1.8-3.2
percentage points for some recent intervals (1978-85 for nominal, 1974-78
and 1981-85 for real growth; see table 18.2 below). The corresponding mea-
sures for IPO inflation fall in the 1.1-1 .6 range. The worst errors coincide
with major cyclical changes such as the recessions ofthe mid-1970s and early
1980s and the disinflation of 1981-85.
The absolute or squared errors increase systematically with the span of
forecast in quarters. For example, the MAEs of the GNP growth predictions
in 1970-75 fall in the ranges of0.4-0.5, 0.8-1.0,1.7-1.9, and 2.8-3.5 for
one, two, four, and eight quarters ahead, respectively (see table 14.5).
13.5 When and Why Growth and Inflation Were Underpredicted
or Overpredicted
In the 1950s and 1960s forecasters generally underpredicted the nominal
GNP growth in years of cyclical expansion-that is, most of the time. This
implies negative averages of errors measured as differences, predicted minus
actual values. Thus, the errors ofeight sets ofGNP forecasts for 1953-70, in
billions of dollars, had means of - 2.5 for the base (current-year) levels,
- 4.0 for the base-to-target changes, and - 6.5 for the target (next-year) lev-
els. 11 Positive errors (i.e., overestimates ofGNP changes or levels) occurred
11. The level errors are equal to the algebraic sums of the corresponding base and change
errors. For the sources ofthe eight forecasts, see table 13.1, n. a.394 Chapter Thirteen
in this period in only six years, each ofwhich was associated with a recession
or a major slowdown (1954, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1967, and 1970). The largest
underestimation errors occurred in times of booming economic activity, later
accompanied also by rising inflation (1955, 1965-66, and 1968-69) (for de-
tails see Zamowitz 1974, table 5 and pp. 578-80).
Thus the underestimation of GNP changes probably reflected in the main
an underestimation ofreal growth. The few year-to-year decreases were more
often missed (i.e., increases were predicted instead) than either under- or
overstated. RGNP forecasts are not available for the early postwar period, but
predictions of the index of industrial production (IP) are and they provide
some confirming evidence. Ofthe seven sets ofIP forecasts between 1951 and
1963, all but one have negative mean errors ofchanges and all but two have
negative mean errors oflevels (Zamowitz 1967, table 4, p. 34).12
Scattered annual forecasts of the consumer and wholesale price indexes in
1949-67, assembled and examined in Zarnowitz 1969b, show no evidence of
an overall bias for CPI and a prevalence ofoverestimates for WPI. Forecasters
tended to underestimate the large changes and to overestimate the small
changes in the indexes, and most of the price changes in this period were
relatively small. There is much extrapolative inertia in these forecasts, al-
though most of them were more accurate than naive model projections and
produced definite positive correlations between the predicted and actual index
changes. This evidence too is consistent with the hypothesis that it was mainly
real growth that was underpredicted in the GNP forecasts summarized here.
The overall timidity of these predictions can be understood only in their
historical context. Forecasters used the available data, which referred mainly
to the interwar period, while dealing with the very different economic envi-
ronment of the postwar era. Many expected a replay of what happened after
World War I, repeatedly using analogies that turned out to be basically false.
The recession of 1948-49 occurred later and was less severe than they had
projected. Before the proper lessons from the errors were drawn, the shocks
ofthe Korean War created new uncertainties. The recessions that followed in
1953-60 were relatively mild but discouragingly frequent (three in 8 years).
However, forecasters gradually learned to expect higher rates of economic
growth. RGNP increases were strongly underestimated in 1959-67 but over-
estimated in 1962-76. That the nominal GNP forecasts were on average too
low in the latter period must be attributed entirely to the underprediction of
the rate ofincrease in IPD (cf. lines 5, 6, and 10, odd columns, table 13.1).
In fact, inflation accelerated greatly in the late 1960s and, especially, in the
middle and late 1970s, due to the monetary overstimulation during the Viet-
12. Weighted mean errors, in index points 1947-49 = 100, are approximately 0.8 for base
levels, - 1.0 for changes, and - O. 1 for target levels. Note that IP is less affected by the underes-
timation ofgrowth than GNP is. This is related to the fact that IP is in real units and has a smaller
trend and larger cyclical component (its forecasts suffer more from turning-point errors; see Zar-
nowitz 1972b, pp. 194-95).395 Short-Term Predictions of General Economic Conditions
nam War and then the unusual supply and price shocks and the public and
policy reactions to them. Bouts of inflation alternated with poorly managed
efforts to disinflate. Real activity declined mildly in 1970, more seriously in
1974-75. The turning points in both inflation and output were generally
missed; so the rises in IPD were increasingly underpredicted at the same time
that the rises in RGNP were increasingly overpredicted between 1962 and
1978. These errors offset each other to produce GNP forecasts with mostly
negative but on average small errors (cf. lines 2-3, 6-7, and 10-11, odd col-
umns).
Finally, inflation peaked in 1980-81 and decreased gradually to much
lower levels in the following five years. Predicted rates moved down with a
lag, thus tending to overestimate actual rates. Later, inflation increased again,
but slowly, which was on the whole well anticipated. RGNP growth was
underestimated in 1980, when the recession turned out to be milder than ex-
pected' and in the years ofstrong recovery and expansion (1983-84, 1988); it
was greatly overestimated in 1982, after a severe downturn cut short an un-
usually weak and brief rise in activity. However, more than half the time, in
both the 1970s and the 1980s, the errors of the annual forecasts for all three
variables were moderate (less than one percentage point), and on the whole
the under- and overestimates balanced each other well, as can be seen from
the results for 1969-89 (lines 4, 8, and 12).
13.6 Bias or Cyclical Errors?
Persistent under- or overprediction of actual values suggests a failure to
avoid bias by learning from past errors. Thus it is desirable that the mean error
of a set of forecasts not differ statistically from zero. Also, forecasts should
be efficient, that is, uncorrelated with their own errors, else again the presence
ofa systematic error is inferred.
These requirements are certainly logical and indeed are often treated as
almost obvious and minimal in the literature. Yet they are based on assump-
tions that are only too frequently shown to be false in practice, namely, that
the behavioral patterns of and relations among the variables concerned are
essentially time invariant and known. In reality, the processes underlying the
time series to be predicted are not necessarily stable, because they reflect the
changing structure and institutions ofthe economy and perhaps shifts in eco-
nomic policies and behavior. Correspondingly, forecasting models and tech-
niques also do not remain unchanged for long. The available samples ofcon-
sistent and comparable predictions are in many cases too small to establish the
existence and evaluate the importance of systematic errors. Finally, measure-
ment errors may distort and fragment both the time-series data and the related
forecasts.
For any or all of these reasons, ex post tests can and do find evidences of
bias and/or inefficiency even in forecasts which would be judged very good ex396 Chapter Thirteen
ante (those that come from respected professional sources or enjoy wide sup-
port when made or are based on state-of-the-art models). It seems unlikely
that these forecasts are in fact systematically deficient in the sense of having
persistent yet avoidable errors. More plausibly, such errors are themselves
period specific and ofthe kind that could not be readily detected and corrected
at the time when the forecasts were made.
Forecasts of inflation by individual respondents to the quarterly ASA-
NBER surveys in 1968-79 provide an instructive example in this context.
Tests presented in chapter 16 show a high proportion of these forecasts to be
biased and inefficient, in contrast to the corresponding predictions for five
other aggregative variables, where the incidence of such errors is low. In ad-
dition, there is evidence that the average forecasts of inflation from the same
surveys are inconsistent with the hypothesis of unbiasedness for the period
1970-74 but not for 1975-79 and 1980-84 (Hafer and Hein 1985, esp. pp.
390-92). It makes good sense to argue that changes in inflation were particu-
larly difficult to predict in the first half ofthe 1970s because of novel exoge-
nous developments and shocks. There was the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods arrangements and transition to the floating exchange regime; the im-
position and elimination of wage and price controls; international food short-
ages and huge price increases; and the oil embargo and quadrupling of oil
prices. The resulting elements of inescapable surprise must be taken into ac-
count in assessments of the generally poor forecasts of inflation rates in this
period, which lagged behind the actual rates and underestimated them greatly
most ofthe time (see chapter 14, sec. 14.5 for an analysis by subperiods).
In chapter 16, the forecasts are compared with the last data available prior
to the benchmark revisions of 1976 and 1980. Keane and Runkle (1990) show
that when instead the preliminary (first release) data are used, the proportions
of bias and inefficiency in the one-step-ahead inflation forecasts are much
smaller, so that the rationality hypothesis can no longer be rejected. Their
estimation and replication work is very careful and proficient but their expla-
nation relies too heavily on measurement errors to be really persuasive. Sys-
tematic yet unpredictable errors in inflation data may well have been concen-
trated in the first half of the 1970s like the similar large errors in inflation
forecasts, and for much the same reasons. Early estimates have much in com-
mon with extrapolations. Otherwise, it is not clear why data errors should
have been so critical for the forecasts ofinflation but not for the other variables
that tend to be subject to larger revisions. 13 In general, the issue ofwhether or
13. This is certainly true for GNP and such ofits components as the change in business inven-
tories, a series notorious for grave measurement problems and errors. Most of the data used to
deflate GNP come from the components ofthe CPI and the producer price index (PPI), and these
microdata usually do not have large revisions, except for changes in weights and seasonal factors.
The revisions in the IPD series to which the ASA-NBER inflation forecasts refer are thus presum-397 Short-Term Predictions of General Economic Conditions
not forecasts are unbiased or "rational" must surely hinge on much more than
the choice between preliminary and revised data. 14
Early studies found that forecasters often underestimated changes in micro-
and macroeconomic variables, and they discussed the meaning and possible
sources of this phenomenon (Theil [1958] 1965, ch. 5; Zarnowitz 1967, ch.
4). But longer time series of forecasts that are now available show greater
frequencies of overestimates in the recent years and little evidence of any
overall bias. This is illustrated in table 13.2 for the government and private
predictions of annual rates of change in nominal and real GNP and IPD,
1969-89. The mean errors ofboth the CEA and the ASA-NBER survey fore-
casts are all fractional, small relative to the corresponding standard devia-
tions, and statistically not different from zero by conventional tests (lines 5,
11, and 16).15 On the whole, overestimates were just slightly more numerous
in the CEA set, and underestimates were slightly more numerous in the ASA-
NBER set; and neither type oferror was systematically larger in size (cf. lines
1-2,6-7, and 12-13).
By far the largest errors are found in the third category, where the predicted
changes differ from the actual changes in sign. Such directional or turning-
point errors occurred in the annual forecasts oftable 13.2 only for RGNP (line
8). They relate to some ofthe years ofbusiness cycle contraction and troughs,
namely, 1970, 1974, and 1982, and are all positive. 16
This suggests that it is the failure to predict business downturns that is the
major shortcoming of these forecasts. More general evidence comes from
comparisons of the accuracy of forecasts classified ex post by the cyclical
nature oftheir target periods. In each case, as shown by the absolute values of
their mean errors and by their standard deviations and MAEs, the forecasts
for contraction and trough years have been much worse than the forecasts for
expansion and peak years (cf. lines 3-4, 9-10, and 14-15). The results for
quarterly predictions confirm and amplify this conclusion (chapter 18, sec.
18.2.2).
ably due in large measure to shifts in the GNPexpenditure weights. It is easy in retrosPect to relate
large shifts in spending patterns to the disturbances of the 1970s. Finally, figure 1 in Keane and
Runkle 1990, p. 723, suggests that the discrepancies between the initial and final estimates ofIPD
were greater in the first than in the second half of their sample period (1968-86), certainly in
levels.
14. It cannot be taken for granted that forecasters aim to predict initial values rather than try to
come closer to the true values. To the extent that revisions are systematically related to some past
information, rational forecasters should be able to take them into account.
15. The ratios ofthe means to their standard errors are all very small (less than 0.3), but there
is no good reason here to make the assumptions of independence, etc., that underlie the simple
significance (t) tests.
16. For more evidence on the importance ofturning-point errors, based on a larger sample of
earlier annual forecasts, see chapter 14, sec. 14.3. Such errors play an even greater role in quar-
terly forecasts, as discussed in Zamowitz 1967, pp. 72-80, 114-20, and Zamowitz 1974, pp.
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Table 13.2 lYpes ofError in Two Sets ofAnnual Forecasts ofNominal and Real GNP
Growth and IPD, 1969-89
CEA ASA-NBER, Median
No. MEb S.D.c MAEd No. MEb S.D.c MAEd
Line Type of ErrotJ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gross National Product (GNP)
1 Underestimates 9 -0.8 0.4 13 -1.0 0.8
2 Overestimates 12 1.0 1.1 7 1.5 1.0
3 B.C. expansions 16 -0.0 1.1 0.9 16 -0.4 1.2 0.9
4 B.C. contractions 5 1.0 1.7 1.2 5 0.9 2.4 1.8
5 Total 21 0.2 1.3 1.0 21 -0.1 1.6 1.2
GNP in Constant Dollars (RGNP)
6 Underestimates 8 -0.9 0.6 9 -1.2 0.9
7 Overestimates 9 0.8 0.6 8 0.5 0.3
8 Directional errors 3 2.3 0.8 3 2.8 1.7
9 B.C. expansions 16 0.1 1.0 0.8 16 -0.5 1.1 0.8
10 B.C. contractions 5 1.1 1.7 1.7 5 1.7 2.1 2.1
11 Total 21 0.3 1.3 1.0 21 0.1 1.6 1.1
GNP Implicit Price Deflator (IPD)
12 Underestimates 9 -1.2 1.0 10 -1.4 1.7
13 Overestimates 11 0.9 0.7 11 1.0 0.7
14 B.C. expansions 16 -0.0 1.0 0.8 16 0.1 1.2 1.0
15 B.C. contractions 5 -0.0 2.2 1.7 5 0.8 2.9 1.8
16 Total 21 0.0 1.4 1.0 21 -0.2 1.7 1.2
aUnderestimates: sign P = sign A and P < A. Overestimates: sign P = sign A and P > A. Directional
errors: sign P =f::. sign A. B.C. expansions: errors of forecasts relating to years of business cycle expan-
sion and peaks. B.C. contractions: errors offorecasts relating to years ofcontraction and troughs.
bME = mean error.
cS.D. = standard deviation.
dMAE = mean absolute error. Not shown where equal to the corresponding ME value without regard to
sign.
13.7 Relative Accuracy
Measures of absolute accuracy, by comparing predicted and actual values,
show how much the former deviate from the unattainable state of perfection
(no errors). More realistic criteria are found in comparisons ofthe accuracy of
forecasts ofdifferent types and from different sources. Some common bench-
marks of predictive performance are provided by models that mechanically
extrapolate information contained in the past record of the series to be pre-
dicted. The appropriate models vary with the characteristics of the variables
and periods concerned. In short, forecasts are best evaluated in relative terms
and by more than one yardstick.
Consider four examples of"naive models": Nl, which projects forward the
last observed level of the predicted variable; N2, which adds to that level the
last known change; N2*, which similarly projects the average ofpast changes;399 Short-Term Predictions ofGeneral Economic Conditions
and N3, based on an autoregressive equation with five terms. All ofeight sets
in an early collection ofannual forecasts ofGNP and IP for periods ending in
1963 proved to be superior to Nl and N2, and all but one also to N2* and N3
(Zamowitz 1967, table 16 and pp. 86-90; N2* in this case averages changes
since 1947). A partial extension of this study through 1969 shows forecasts
continuing to outperform Nl and N2*, as summed up in table 13.3, lines 1-
4. However, the forecasts grew much worse relative to N2 in the middle and
late 1960s. This is because extrapolations of last change in GNP are at their
very best in times when no major fluctuations occur in either output or infla-
tion. Ofcourse, this was a transitory advantage as nominal growth is seldom
so well sustained.
The relative accuracy measures in table 13.3 are ratios of RMSEs of the
forecasts to the corresponding RMSEs of the selected extrapolative models.
The annual CEA and ASA-NBER predictions ofnominal GNP growth easily
outperform the last-change projections (N2), with ratios in the range of0.46
to 0.54 for 1962-89 and subperiods (line 5). The forecasts of real GNP
growth compare still more favorably with N2 (line 8), but those ofIPD infla-
tion do worse, with ratios of 0.72 for CEA and as high as 0.98 for ASA-
NBER in 1969-79 (line 11).
The ratios to N4, the projections of the moving average of changes in the
last four years, are somewhat higher than the N2 ratios, but they too show the
forecasts ofGNP and RGNP in a strong comparative position (lines 6 and 9).
For IPD, however, N4 is less demanding than N2 (line 12).
Finally, N5 is hypothetical and forward looking in that it projects the mean
ofactual changes in the forecast period, a statistic knowable only ex post; but
it is also extremely naive in the sense that it assumes a constant prediction in
each successive unit period. The RMSE of these "random-walk-with-trend"
projections equals the standard deviation of the future actuals. Interestingly,
N5 performs much like N4 here, being justa little weaker for GNP and RGNP
and slightly stronger for IPD (cf. lines 6-7, 9-10, and 12-13).
The upshot is that the annual forecasts under study are generally much more
accurate than an array of simple mechanical extrapolations. The only excep-
tion is the inflation forecasts from surveys when compared with N2 since 1964
and also with N4 and N5 in 1969-79 (lines 2 and 11-13, cols. 2 and 7). The
conclusion is supported by other recent studies, notably McNees 1988b (see
also table 18.1 and text below for additional results and references).
However, it can be argued that the naive models represent minimal stan-
dards. The economic models and reasoning, technical skills, professional ex-
perience' and informed judgment when combined should enable the modem
forecaster to do much better. Indeed, he or she is now expected to satisfy the
demand for frequent predictions of developments over sequences of several
quarters into the future; the old practice of year-end forecasting for the year
ahead is no longer sufficient. So quarterly multiperiod forecasts are now pre-
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business economists for an array of important macroeconomic variables.
These forecasts can be tested against extrapolations from state-of-the-art
times-series models, which include the univariate ARIMA (autoregressive in-
tegrated moving-average) models and the multivariate VAR (vector auto-
regressive) models. Chapter 18 shows that the record of such tests for three
macroeconometric models and group forecasts from a business outlook survey
is mixed. For some variables and periods the forecasts are less accurate than
either ARIMA, VAR, or BVAR (Bayesian vector autoregressions) but the op-
posite is true in about two thirds ofthe comparisons (see table 18.3, pt. B).
Sophisticated time-series models have important lessons for forecasters on
how to decompose, detrend, deseasonalize, and use the stochastic properties
of the series for predictive purposes. They can help avoid bias in forecasting
for processes that are reasonably stable over the periods covered. Economists'
forecasts include extrapolative along with other, analytical and judgmental
elements; thus comparing the errors offorecasts with the errors ofcorrespond-
ing projections from time-series models can yield estimates ofthe net predic-
tive value of the combined nonextrapolative components of the forecast
(which can be positive, zero, or negative). 17 Tests ofrelative accuracy based
on such comparisons pose standards that may be difficult to exceed but that
may not be sufficient to establish the usefulness of those forecasts that meet
them. This is because the strength of the time-series models generally lies in
good projections ofrecent trends that, however, tend to lag behind actual de-
velopments and fail to give timely signals of broad changes in the economy
(turning points in growth rates and levels ofibcome, output, prices, etc.). But
it is precisely such signals that are most needed by users of short-term fore-
casts ofgeneral economic conditions.
13.8 Forecasting Methods and Results
During the period 1968-81, the quarterly ASA-NBER surveys regularly
collected information on some methodological characteristics ofthe forecasts.
The questionnaire asked the participants which of several listed tools they
used and what the relative importance of these items was in their own work.
Large majorities reported using the "informal GNP model," an eclectic and
flexible approach with large elements ofjudgment (Butler and Kavesh 1974).
This "model" actually covers a variety of procedures whereby the major ex-
penditure components of GNP are predicted and combined into an overall
forecast, in nominal and real terms. The last step usually involves various
adjustments that may be iterative and are designed to make the forecast inter-
nally consistent and reasonable in light ofthe currently available information
and beliefs. Table 13.4 tells us that over 70% of the respondents used this
17. For an early discussion and examples, see Mincer and Zamowitz 1969 and other essays in
Mincer 1969a.402 Chapter Thirteen
Table 13.4 Forecasting Methods Used in the ASA-NBER Quarterly Economic Outlook
Surveys, 1968-70, 1974-75, and 1980-81
Informal Leading Anticipations Econometric Econometric Other
GNP Model Indicators Surveys Model-Gutside Model-Gwn Methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Seven Surveys 1968:4-1970:2 (496 replies)b
% using 77 72 65 42 23 17
% ranking first
C 57 14 2 7 7 8
% ranking second 13 32 24 10 7 4
% ranking lowerd 7 24 40 26 10 5
Six Surveys 1974:1-1975:2 (308 repliesY
% using 71 49 53 56 25 14
% ranking first
C 50 5 1 9 16 7
% ranking second 13 30 18 24 7 4
% ranking lowerd 7 25 33 22 3 3
Six Surveys 1980:1-1981:2 (198 repliesY
% using 74 49 42 53 27 19
% ranking firstc 56 12 1 13 13 9
% ranking second 13 21 16 14 6 5
% ranking lowerd 4 14 25 25 7 5
Sources: American Statistical Association and National Bureau ofEconomic Research, Quarterly Survey
ofEconomic Outlook, various issues; author's files and calculations.
aWrite-in but often not specified.
b'fhe August 1969 survey was held in connection with the ASA annual meeting and attracted a very large
number of respondents (128, including 46 regular panelists). Participation in the other surveys varied
from 49 to 83 and averaged 61 .
cMost important.
dRanks 3 to 6 (least important).
eParticipation varied from 46 to 62 and averaged 51.
tParticipation varied from 24 to 46 and averaged 31.
general approach and 50% or more ranked it as first (col. 1). These propor-
tions remained remarkably steady while the survey participation rates de-
clined over time (many casual forecasters who participated in the early years
dropped out, leaving a much smaller core ofregular forecasters only).
Leading indicators were also employed by about 70% of the survey mem-
bership in 1968-70 but later that share declined to about 50%. They were
ranked second by most respondents (col. 2). Anticipations surveys received
references from 65% of members in 1968-70,42% in 1980-81, and gener-
ally lower ranks (col. 3).
Users of outside econometric models accounted for more than 40% of the
early survey members and more than half of those in the 1970s and early
1980s. These forecasters preferred other methods and ranked the outside mod-
els second or lower (col. 4). About one fourth of the respondents had their
own econometric models, and most of them (but perhaps surprisingly not all
and not in the early years) ranked these models first (col. 5). Finally, "other403 Short-Term Predictions ofGeneral Economic Conditions
methods" (e.g., time-series models) were specified by fewer than 20% ofthe
participants and preferred by about half ofthem (col. 6).
The different methods tend to complement each other, for example, new
readings on monthly cyclical indicators and the latest results from an invest-
ment or consumer anticipations survey may be used to modify forecasts from
econometric models or the informal approach. It is therefore understandable
that the predominant forecasting practice is to use various combinations of
these methods or techniques in a more or less judicious fashion. Indeed, this
is the single most important lesson to be drawn from the replies to the question
on methods as elicited in the ASA-NBER surveys. The reported rankings dif-
fer widely, reflecting the backgrounds, interests, and preferences of the indi-
viduals; but no one method is widely treated as if it were self-sufficient and
always superior to each ofthe others.
In an effort to establish whether the forecasters' methodological choices
were associated with significant differences in predictive accuracy, I first ex-
amined regressions ofthe individual errors ofGNP forecasts on dummy vari-
ables representing different methods, one equation for each survey and for
each predictive horizon (Zarnowitz 1971, pp. 65-68). The estimates related
to the early surveys with high participation rates and used alternatively the
classification by first ranks only and by lower ranks as well. Few ofthe coef-
ficients were found to be significant (less than one in six at the 5% level, for
example). The results suggested in general an absence of systematic dif-
ferences between the contributions to the forecast errors of the main listed
methods. 18
A 1975 study by Su and Su, based on the 1968:4-1973:2 ASA-NBER fore-
casts ofabsolute and percentage changes and levels ofGNP, RGNP, IPD, and
the unemployment rate, compared the accuracy of the respondents who
ranked first the informal GNP model with those who preferred econometric
models (own or outside), leading indicators, and other methods. The four
groups varied in their relative performance by variable, span, and type offore-
cast (changes vs. levels) but none surpassed the others consistently. 19
Table 13.5, based on a large number of time series of individual forecasts
ofrates ofchange in GNP, RGNP, and IPD between 1968 and 1980, presents
measures ofaverage accuracy by method that omit occasional forecasters and
aggregate across predictions for the current quarter and three quarters ahead.
(Providing more detail and evidence for other variables would not alter the
conclusions; see Zarnowitz 1983, pp. 84-85). The differences between the
average RMSEs listed in the table are, line by line, very small and ofuncertain
significance; indeed, when rounded off to one decimal point, all but a few of
them would disappear. However, it may be worth noting that when first ranks
18. Most ofthe significant coefficients referred to the thinly populated and apparently inferior
groups such as "other methods" and, for the first ranks, anticipations surveys.
19. See Su and Su 1975, pp. 603-5. All four subsamples generated larger errors than the
consensus forecasts because oflarger variances.404 Chapter Thirteen
Table 13.5 Average RMSEs ofASA-NBER Survey Forecasts, by Methods Ranked First
and Lower, 1968-80
Informal Leading Anticipations Econometric Econometric Other
GNP Model Indicators Surveys Model-outside Model-own Methods
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
According to First-Ranked Method
GNP, % change 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.89 1.09 1.15
RGNP, %
change 1.14 1.24 1.22 1.05 1.25 1.27
IPD, % change 0.71 0.79 0.85 0.72 0.76 0.83
According to Lower-Ranked Method
GNP, % change 1.03 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.76 0.97
RGNP,%
change 1.19 1.12 1.10 1.13 1.12 1.18
IPD, % change 0.76 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.87
Sources: ASA-NBER, Quarterly Survey ofEconomic Outlook, various issues; for more detail, see Zar-
nowitz 1983.
Note: This table covers 79 individuals in at least 12 ofthe 46 quarterly surveys in the period from 1968:4
through 1980:1. The entries represent averages ofRMSEs offorecasts for the current survey quarter and
three quarters ahead. The errors are measured as differences, percentage predicted change minus per-
centage actual change, for each successive nonoverlapping target quarter. Measures in lines 1-3 refer to
responses ofthose forecasters who reported using the given method as primary (ties for the first rank are
not included). Measures in lines 4-6 refer to the responses of those forecasters who reported using the
given method but ranking it second through sixth.
only are considered (lines 1-3), outside econometric models tend to have the
smallest errors, with the informal approach a close second. When lower ranks
are used (lines 4-6), own econometric models, leading indicators, and antic-
ipations surveys have more favorable relative positions.
This is consistent with the view that combining the different procedures
helps, particularly when done by experienced forecasters. Thus our sample
measures indicate that subscribers perform somewhat better than model pro-
prietors on average over time, and the probable reason is this: the former
group is dominated by large companies using well-known econometric ser-
vice bureaus and their own professional staffs, whereas the latter group in-
cludes some individuals who are exclusive users of their own models and
some teams ofexperts selling their large-model forecasts and advice.
Some broadly corroborative evidence is also available from other sources.
According to the annual surveys of the National Association of Business
Economists (NABE) in 1975-79, 52%-60% of members preferred "eclectic
judgmental" methods, and 22%-28% preferred "eclectic econometric" meth-
ods (Conlan and Wickersham 1982). A special mail survey sent to the Blue
Chip forecasters in 1987 showed the following mix of average contributions
to predictions of real growth, inflation, and interest rates: judgment, 48%;
econometric model, 28%; time-series analysis, 24% (based on more detailed
figures in Batchelor and Dua 1990, p. 5). Even the organizations with their405 Short-Term Predictions of General Economic Conditions
own large-scale econometric models assigned sizable weights to judgment
(20%-50%, on average about 30%) and other elements such as time-series
methods, current data analysis, and interaction with others (10%-20%).
Thus, these forecasters estimated the contributions oftheir models as such at
45%-80% (on average 60%).20
Some of the lists mix techniques and theories. For example, the NABE
members' classification in 1980 and 1981 includes, in addition to the large
judgmental and econometric groups (averaging 49% and 26%), "rational ex-
pectations" (12%), "monetarists" (6%), and other or nonrespondents. Batch-
elor and Dua (1990) report on an attempt to cross-classify the Blue Chip fore-
casters by "ideology" (Keynesian, monetarist, supply-sider, RE, Austrian,
other) and "technique" (three categories, as noted above). They find some
support for the inference that the Keynesian-econometric combination had an
advantage over others, but note that individuals in their sample generally re-
lied on more than one technique and used elements of more than one theory.
Also, Keynesian models and econometric methods were developed earlier
than the modem versions ofthe other theories and methods, so they may have
gained adherents with more practical and diverse experience. 21
13.9 Search for the Best and the Complementarity of
Suboptimal Forecasts
The classical research strategy of economists looking into the future is to
form conditional expectations based on an "optimal" model. This involves the
use ofthe preferred theory ofthe behavior ofeconomic agents as constrained
by the available resources and the institutional framework; identification of
the endogenous variables and the relationships among them; specific assump-
tions about economic policies and exogenous events ordevelopments; approx-
imations with existing data, statistical estimation of the model parameters,
and derivation ofpredictions. This line ofattack led to the macroeconometric
models and forecasts.
But macroeconomic theories differ and no one is demonstrably superior and
generally accepted. The complexity and changing dynamics and structure of
the economy make it costly and difficult to collect the required information
and learn from it on a current basis. Testing of the theories is impeded and
ideological differences persist. Even substantial agreement on fundamentals
20. See McNees 1981, p. 7. The weights come from 11 sources ofmacroeconomic forecasts:
BEA, Chase, DRI, General Electric Co., Georgia State University, Kent Economic Institute,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, RSQE (Michigan), Townsend-Greenspan & Co., UCLA, and
Wharton.
21. The weights placed on the listed theories by the average responses to the May 1987 Blue
Chip survey were as follows: Keynesian, 43%; monetarist, 20%; supply side, 12%; rational ex-
pectations, 8%; Austrian 4%; other, 13%. Batchelor and Dua examined annual forecasts ofreal
growth, inflation, and the Treasury bill rate made by 44 respondents on selected dates in 1976-86
(1990, pp. 4-10).406 Chapter Thirteen
ofrational behavior is not sufficient to resolve conflicts ofviews on what con-
stitutes credible restrictions in the econometric models of the economy. The
selections of endogenous versus exogenous variables are particularly contro-
versial.
Moreover, some of the best-known macroeconometric models are so very
large that they are unwieldy and difficult to comprehend, often posing exces-
sive data requirements and resorting to ad hoc theories and arbitrary assump-
tions in dealing with detailed relations about which little is known. Many
features of the existing models viewed as "Keynesian" are not acceptable to
critics ofdiverse persuasion: monetarist, rational expectations, public choice,
supply side. This applies notably to the treatment of economic policies as
exogenous, basically benevolent, and effective not only in principle but also
often in practice. But the critics have yet to produce their own, and evidently
better, econometric models ofthe economy.
The interest of academic economists in practical econometric forecasting,
never strong to begin with, was much reduced by the recent controversies,
which partly explains the rise in popularity within the profession of new sta-
tistical methods of univariate and multivariate time-series prediction. Econo-
metric forecasts were compared successively with simple autoregressive
(AR), ARIMA, VAR, and BVAR forecasts. The challengers claimed that the
time-series models have the advantage of low costs and replicability but yet
are competitive with the best-known complex and expensive econometric
models with respect to many, though not all, variables, horizons, and periods;
or that the econometric forecasts are inefficient in that lower errors can be
obtained by combining them with some time-series models (Nelson 1972;
Cooper 1972; Cooper and Nelson 1975; Lupoletti and Webb 1986; Litterman
1986).
In their countercriticism, econometricians noted correctly that only their
forecasts have the potential advantages ofbeing based on models with identi-
fiable structures and specific assumptions about exogenous variables and the
possibility to explain and simulate as well as predict. However, they also ar-
gued that their models require the use ofprior knowledge in structural speci-
fication and inspection ofthe equation residuals before each forecast is made.
The charge against the time-series models is that they fail to take proper ad-
vantage of economic theory, may be restricted to too few variables and too
many lags, and are unlikely to predict well over longer horizons (Howrey,
Klein, and McCarthy 1976; Runkle 1987). A lively debate about the methods
of evaluation, the linkages between, and the relative performance of time-
series and econometric models has continued for years and shows no signs of
exhaustion. 22
22. The following papers are cited for their innovative nature orbecause they review the subject
(some are accompanied by several comments): Zellner and Palm 1974; Wallis 1977, 1989; Arm-
strong 1978; Zellner 1979; Fildes 1985; Longbottom and Holly 1985; McNees 1986; Dhrymes
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At the same time that the econometricians and time-series analysts engaged
in a competition guided by the principle of constructing optimal predictive
models, considerable work was being done on combining multiple individual
forecasts ofvarious types. This research demonstrates that such combinations
generally improve forecast accuracy, often substantially and by very acces-
sible and inexpensive methods, including simple averaging (see Clemen 1989
for a survey with annotated bibliography). I first presented and discussed the
evidence on gains from aggregating individual GNP forecasts in 1967 (pp. 5
and 123-26); a more recent and more comprehensive analysis is given in
chapter 15 ofthis volume. Much has been learned from two decades ofeffort
to develop a theory ofoptimal forecast combinations, which however does not
promise a single best rule but rather suggests different procedures depending
on the underlying assumptions and purposes (Winkler 1989).23
The idea of combining forecasts is to some critics inconsistent with the
principle of optimal information-processing and modeling: an econometric
structure that does not "emcompass" what can be predicted by a time-series
extrapolation, for example, is simply misspecified (Chong and Hendry 1986).
Further, combining (like time-series models) can result only in unconditional
forecasts and may generate internal inconsistencies, for example, predictions
ofGNP components that do not add up to predictions oftotal GNP.
In a world in which economic processes and relations tended to be stable
and identifiable from good data promptly available at low cost, pooling of
information would always be preferred to pooling forecasts (which in this case
should not vary much anyway). But ours is a very different world where "eco-
nomic change is a law oflife" (Burns 1968, p. 226); new surprises and uncer-
tainties continually arise, and valuable information is costly and at no time
exclusively possessed by any single expert or embodied in any single model.
Timely short-term forecasts for the economy under such conditions can hardly
afford the costs ofcollecting all the relevant data and knowledge. Thus com-
bining forecasts may be justified here as a practical way to aggregate the
pieces of information that are available to forecasters, and the procedure can
be formalized along Bayesian lines (Winkler 1989).
In particular, combining bona fide outside forecasts with different charac-
teristics is an expedient method for a decision maker to reduce the large-error
risk associated with relying on one particular model or one individual's judg-
ment. 24 Here then is an appropriate role for users (and collectors and analysts)
ofthe forecasts. However, the essential function ofmakers offorecasts is very
different, namely, to add some predictive value to the sum of diverse infor-
23. The literature advanced from combinations of unbiased one-step forecasts with weights
constrained to sum to 1 (Bates and Granger 1969) through unconstrained least squares (Granger
and Ramanathan 1984) to Bayesian prior-information and shrinkage techniques (Clemen and
Winkler 1986; Diebold and Pauly 1990). For a study of particular interest to macroeconomists,
see Bischoff 1989.
24. A close and often noted analogy is with an investor's strategy to reduce risk through port-
folio diversification.408 Chapter Thirteen
mational inputs acquired from outside (data, tools, interactions with others).
Unless a forecaster produces some such "value-added," his or her product will
not be sufficiently differentiated to make a contribution to the combined fore-
cast and to be ofcontinuing interest to informed users.
13.10 Model and Judgment
At the most basic level, two ingredients can be distinguished that are
blended in the making ofalmost any macroeconomic forecast: (1) some more
or less systematic technique or model and (2) judgment in choosing and mod-
ifying ingredient (1) and adjusting its results. Some forecasters wish to reduce
judgment to the choice of the procedure and rely mainly on the model in the
interest ofobjectivity, replicability, and avoidance ofbiases ofperception and
assessment. Uses oftime-series models that require little orno individual fine-
tuning, such as unrestricted univariate orvector autoregressions, provide good
examples. Others exercise their judgment much more extensively so as to ap-
ply prior knowledge and experience in diagnosing the changing conditions
and flexibly adapting the current forecast to them. This is illustrated by the
practices not only of many business economists who have no formal models
oftheir own but also ofthose econometricians who often judgmentally adjust
many predictions generated by their models in attempts to improve their ac-
curacy.
The major role of such constant-term adjustments in macroeconometric
forecasting of the 1960s is amply demonstrated in studies by Evans, Haitov-
sky, and Treyz (1972) and Haitovsky and Treyz (1972) (for an interpretation,
see also Zamowitz 1972b). First, the ex ante predictions by teams equipped
with the then-representative large models, Wharton and Office of Business
Economics (aBE) (Department ofCommerce), are much more accurate with
than without judgmental adjustments (i.e., in their final form as issued, XA*,
rather than in the intermediate, unpublished stage as generated mechanically
from the models, XA). This is summed up in table 13.6, which also indicates
that the reductions in the MAEs produced by the adjustments are particularly
large for the shortest predictive spans (lines 1-4, cols. 1-3).25
Second, the errors of ex ante forecasts are on average smaller in absolute
size than the errors ofthe corresponding ex post forecasts that incorporate the
same adjustments: the MAE ratios XA*/XP* tend to fall in the 0.6-0.8 range
(lines 5-8, cols. 1-3). This is surprising, since XP* use the reported realized
values ofthe exogenous variables and should on this account be more accurate
than XA*, which use the projected values of these variables. Although the
forecasters' adjustments are themselves a source oferrors that may either re-
inforce or offset the errors in the models and external extrapolations, their net
25. The results for some other variables are similar. See, e.g., Zamowitz 1972b, table 6 and
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Table 13.6 The Effects ofJudgmental Adjustments on the Accuracy ofForecasts











1967:2-1969:3b Four Models, 1980s
lQ 4Q All lQ 4Q 8Q AIle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% ofPredictions
MAE Ratios: XA*/XAd Improved by Judgmenr
0.2 0.6 0.4 66* 47 65 59
0.2 0.9 0.6 55 50 50 52
0.3 0.6 0.5 60 48 50 53
0.2 0.7 0.5 62* 57 58 59
% ofRMSEs
MAE Ratios: XA*/XP*f Reduced by Judgmentg
0.6 1.1 0.8 100 50 50 67
0.7 0.7 0.8 75 25 25 42
0.8 0.8 0.7 75 50 50 58
0.7 0.9 0.8 76 68 63 69
Source: Cols. 1-3; based on Haitovsky and Treyz 1972, table 1 and p. 319. Cols. 4-7: based on
McNees 1990, table 4 and pp. 46-48.
aGNP = nominal GNP; RGNP = real GNP; UR = civilian unemployment rate. Total refers to
averages for the same 3 variables (cols. 1-3) and for 21 variables covered (cols. 4-7).
bAverages for the Wharton model and the OBE model forecasts. lQ and 4Q denote one quarter
ahead and four quarters ahead, respectively. "All" refers to averages for lQ, 2Q, 3Q, 4Q, and 1-
year-ahead forecasts.
eRefers to averages for 1Q, 4Q, and 8Q (eight quarters ahead) forecasts.
dMAE = mean absolute error. XA* = judgmentally adjusted ex ante forecasts, XA = unad-
justed ex ante forecasts.
epercentage of times that adjusted predictions were more accurate than those generated mechan-
ically. Total number ofobservations for lQ forecasts in line 4 is 841. An asterisk after a number
indicates that it is significantly different from 50 at the 90% confidence level.
fXP* = judgmentally adjusted ex post forecasts. XA* and XP* incorporate the same adjust-
ments.
gRMSE = root mean square error. The number ofthe RMSEs in each ofcols. 4-6 is 4 (lines 5-
7) and 71 (line 8).
effect was apparently to partially compensate for the other inaccuracies. Both
outside information and judgment can help correct for errors that an unaided
model would commit, but uncontrolled interactions between the different cat-
egories oferrors may present a serious problem. 26
Comparisons of Wharton and OBE forecasts ofGNP and RGNP in 1966-
69 with largely judgmental forecasts by business economists yield mixed re-
26. On cases where the ex post forecast errors exceed the ex ante ones without adjustments,
which suggests that model misspecifications are more than offset by errors in the exogenous in-
puts, see Zamowitz 1972b, pp. 27-28 (also, cf. comments by Okun and Eckstein in Zamowitz
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suits (Zamowitz 1972b, tables 7 and 8, pp. 222-27). The adjusted ex ante
forecasts of Wharton and OBE hold an edge over two sets of the other fore-
casts but not two others (including ASA-NBER group median predictions).
The ex post forecasts are somewhat less accurate.
These comparisons are of limited value because the available samples of
forecasts that can be matched are small, and they refer to old models that have
been much revised since. Some new results are presented in McNees 1990 for
"four prominent macroeconometric forecasters . . . who . . . have provided
data on both their publicized (adjusted) and mechanical (unadjusted) forecasts
(pp. 46-47). Table 13.6 gives a summary (cols. 4-7). Judgment improved
55%-66% of the individual predictions for one quarter ahead and reduced
75%-100% of their RMSEs. Here the adjustments tend to receive much help
from data on weekly and monthly indicators. For longer spans, the propor-
tions are considerably lower but in general still 50% or higher overall. 27
Counts ofhow often judgmental adjustments improved accuracy do not tell
us how large the reductions in the averages ofabsolute or squared errors were.
Even so, the new measures seem to leave judgment a smaller role than the old
ones do. This could be due to the more recent models being better specified or
including more efficient predetermined rules for adjusting residuals or some
other reasons. An analysis of the relation between errors of published (ad-
justed) forecasts and errors ofmechanical forecasts suggests that the judgmen-
tal adjustments, although mostly helpful, are more often than not too large;
the forecasters would do better if they relied on them somewhat less and on
their own models somewhat more (McNees 1990, pp. 49-51). But additional
evidence is needed to clarify this important aspect ofthe actual use ofmacro-
econometric models in forecasting.
In my view, it is still largely valid to conclude, as past research did, that the
contributions ofprofessional judgment and experience to the accuracy ofmac-
roeconomic predictions tend to be both important and positive. After all, an
economist's knowledge and analysis ofcurrent developments, which a model
cannot have, should be able to improve on the mechanical forecasts from that
model. This need not at all be inconsistent with psychologists' findings that
cast doubt on the value ofuntrained and unmotivated "common sense" in ex-
perimental predictive environments.
13.11 New Comprehensive Comparisons
A detailed study of the forecasting performance of the NBER-ASA Quar-
terly Economic Outlook Survey 1968:4-1990:1 has been completed very re-
cently (Zamowitz and Braun 1991). The results confirm that the dispersion
across the individual participants' forecasts is typically large and rising with
27. Compare col. 4 with cols. 5-7 in the table. A conspicuous exception is the RMSEs for
RGNP in line 6, cols. 5-7. For more detail on more variables, see McNees 1990, table 4.411 Short-Term Predictions ofGeneral Economic Conditions
the length of the predictive horizon. Errors of the average change forecasts
cumulate over longer spans with great regularity for a variety of time series.
Errors of marginal change and level forecasts, too, often increase with the
distance to the target quarter, although by smaller margins and less regularly.
The more autocorrelated variables such as real GNP and consumption are
much easier to forecast, and are much better predicted, than variables with
high random variability such as residential investment and change in business
inventories (all forecasts of series with trends refer to percentage changes).
Inflation was underestimated and poorly predicted by most forecasters most
ofthe time.
Simple averaging across the corresponding responses to each successive
survey results in group mean forecasts that are generally much more accurate
than the majority of individual forecasts. However, for some variables and
periods the combinations work much better than for others. The more differ-
entiated and the more complementary the information embodied in their com-
ponents, the better are the group mean (consensus) forecasts.
Table 13.7, which covers rates of change in GNP, RGNP, and IPO from
1968:4 to 1990:1, compares the mean individual and the consensus forecasts
from the NBER-ASA surveys with some representative econometric and time-
series forecasts. The econometric predictions are those based on the model of
the University of Michigan Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics
(RSQE), the longest available series of consistent forecasts of this type. The
BVAR forecasts use the five-variable, six-lag quarterly model introduced in
chapter 12 (with M2). The Sims probabilistic model is also ofthe BVAR type
Table 13.7 Nine Sets ofForecasts Ranked according to Their Average RMSEs, Three
Variables, 1968:4-1990:1
Gross National GNP in Constant Implicit Price
Product (GNP) Dollars (RGNP) Deflator (IPD)
ARMSE Rank ARMSE Rank ARMSE Rank
Line Forecast (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 NBER-ASA median 1.90 4 1.94 7 1.53 7
2 NBER-ASA consensus 1.586 1 1.58 3 1.21 5
3 Michigan (RSQE) 1.98 5 1.87 5 1.42 6
4 BVAR(A) 2.69 8 1.90 6 1.62 8
5 BVAR(B) 1.89 3 1.40 1 1.03 3
6 Sims(A) 2.30 7 2.08 8 .97 2
7 Sims(B) 1.594 2 1.47 2 .66 1
8 Sims-Todd ARIMA(A) 3.05 9 2.26 9 1.69 9
9 Sims-Todd ARIMA(B) 2.03 6 1.60 4 1.09 4
Source: Zamowitz and Braun 1991, table 29.
Note: ARMSE (average root-mean-square error) is computed by taking the mean of the RMSEs across
the five spans 0-1, ... ,0-5. The smallest ARMSE is ranked 1, and the largest ARMSE is ranked 9,
for each ofthe three variables.412 Chapter Thirteen
but allows time variation in coefficients and forecast error variance; it is a
nonlinear, nine-variable, five-lag model (Sims 1989; for an earlier version, see
Litterman 1986). The univariate ARIMAs are as specified in Sims and Todd
1991. All these time-series models are estimated with the presently available
data that incorporate all revisions; hence the forecasts based on them are in
this sense ex post. But the forecasts are generated sequentially, using only the
information preceding the date ofthe forecast.
Two alternative assumptions, A and B, are employed for the comparisons
in table 13.7. Variant A is that the last-known values of the variables con-
cerned refer to the previous quarter, t - 1; variant B is that they refer to the
current quarter, t. A is preferred because the quarterly data for t are not known
to the real-time forecasters, but B is to some extent justified because the fore-
casters do know and use some monthly and weekly data released in quarter t
(and the latest economic news generally). The truth falls somewhere in be-
tween but probably more often closer to A than B, for two reasons: (1) the
forecasters' information about the most recent developments is limited and
deficient; (2) the forecasters use preliminary data, and the time-series models
use revised data.
For variant A comparisons, the average RMSEs of the consensus (group
mean) survey forecasts are the lowest for GNP and RGNP and the second
lowest for IPD, following the Sims (A) model (lines 1-4, 6, and 8). The
variant B comparisons are rather strongly biased in favor of the ex post fore-
casts with time-series models. The ARMSEs are all much lower for the variant
B predictions than for their variant A counterparts (cf. lines 4, 6, and 8 with
lines 5, 7, and 9). When all nine sets of forecasts listed in table 13.7 are
considered, the Sims (B) model ranks 2,2, and 1 for GNP, RGNP, and IPD,
respectively. The corresponding ranks of BVAR (B) are also high: 3, 1, and
3. The ARIMA forecasts tend to be less accurate. 28
13.12 A Preview
The last part of this book develops several themes already introduced and
some additional ones. Chapter 14 argues that the accuracy and properties of
forecasts depend heavily on the economic characteristics of the periods cov-
ered but only weakly and not systematically on the differences among the
forecasters. Offsets between errors in the corresponding predictions of real
growth and inflation are demonstrated and analyzed. Multiperiod quarterly
forecasting is shown to pose much greater difficulties than annual forecasting.
Chapter 15 discusses the variety of predictions covered by quarterly busi-
ness outlook surveys. Combining individual forecasts from different profes-
sional sources-business analysts, academic economists, corporate execu-
28. Note that these results conceal the differences between the forecast horizons, which are
sometimes important, and that the rankings for some other variables differ considerably. Thus, the
Michigan forecasts rank higher for the longer spans and are best for the rate ofunemployment.413 Short-Term Predictions ofGeneral Economic Conditions
tives-can result in significant gains. Thus the group mean forecasts are on
the average over time more accurate than most of the component sets. But
there is also a moderate degree ofconsistency in the relative performance ofa
large number ofthe survey members.
Chapter 16 presents extensive results from testing for bias and serially cor-
related errors in a collection of time series ofquarterly forecasts with several
horizons and for several variables. It argues against the presumption ofration-
ality in the sense that one should not expect the macroeconomic forecasts to
be typically either uniform, unbiased, or self-fulfilling. The tests are more
favorable to composite group forecasts than to most ofthe individual forecast
sets, and less favorable to predictions of inflation than to those ofother vari-
ables, including RGNP growth and unemployment.
Chapter 17 uses unique survey data on matched point and probabilistic fore-
casts of inflation and GNP growth to study how the degree of consensus
among forecasters is related to the degree of uncertainty as revealed by the
diffuseness of the appropriate probability forecasts. This means that the dis-
agreement among forecasters tends to understate uncertainty but that rising
disagreement often indicates rising uncertainty. Also, there is evidence that
expectations of higher inflation generate greater uncertainty about inflation,
and that the latter has adverse effects on real growth.
Finally, chapter 18 finds no evidence that U.S. macroeconomic forecasts
have grown systematically worse, that is, less accurate, more biased, or both
(as some critics have charged). True, large errors in predictions of both real
growth and inflation occurred in some recent years (the mid- and late 1970s
and early 1980s) but these were times of high concentration ofunanticipated
shocks and setbacks. The major failures offorecasting are shown to be related
mainly to the incidence of slowdowns and contractions in general economic
activity. Accordingly, progress in forecasting will require better handling of
the difficult problem of turning-point prediction. There is need to combine
econometric and time-series models with uses ofleading indicators to reduce
the length and variability of the lags in recognizing recessions (see also Zar-
nowitz and Moore 1991).